INTRODUCTION
Mergers have become a part of the corporate world. Mega-mergers and smaller mergers occur, with some lasting years and some dissolving rather quickly. Financial interests seem to drive these mergers (1) (2) (3) 6 ).
In medicine, mergers have been occurring with increasing frequency during the last two decades. Managed care systems and hospital systems merge for financial gain, to corner larger shares of the market, and to provide a broader range of services (4, 6) .
This trend has also been occurring within Psychiatric Education, particularly in psychiatric residency programs. During the last fifteen years, a number of mergers between residency programs have been planned, with some of these proceeding (5) 
ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO A MERGER
The demise of most federally funded community mental health centers has seriously cut into funding for psychiatry residency training (6) . There is a paucity of available funds for resident stipends, especially when part of the stipend is designated for education and psychiatry training. This limits the time available for residents and faculty to interact with non-patient care activities such as supervision and seminars.
Managed care entities, in an attempt to provide patient care at the least possible cost, has cut into educational time with residents. Increasing regulations, documentation, and oversight responsibilities have also led to reduced patient care and teaching time. As medical faculty are required to earn higher percentages of their salary seeing patients, there has been a decrement in the effective time available for teaching. In some areas, the financial requirements are so great and reimbursement so scarce that teaching becomes a few moments between patients, whether more is needed or not.
As hospitals, the traditional funding source for residents, have been dealing with decreased profits, increased regulations and increased public scrutiny, they have increasingly required resident stipends to be used primarily for patient care, and education as a secondary goal. These needs have led to the increasing use of "body count" systems to insure residents are seeing patients to help the hospital's bottom line(4). Hospital and federal regulations increasingly cut education activities from the activities counted in the "body count." This requires education to occur on the run or be paid for by other means. It is regrettable that pro-education hospitals are being driven to curtail education to keep the hospital afloat financially.
Currently programs are required to comply with the ACGME requirements for night call-no more often than every three nights, an eighty hour work week limit, no more than thirty continuous work hours, and ten hours off between duty periods. These new work hour limitations and a growing interest in maintaining work-life balance during residency have led to the need for innovative approaches to provide adequate coverage in the event of medical or family leave absences (6) . Larger programs feel resident absences less acutely. There is pressure to enlarge residency programs to moderate this effect; but increased funding to support this is not always readily available.
Since it is financially difficult to start new psychiatry residency programs, entities which desire to have residents in their institutions to provide patient care and/or education occasionally have to rely on non-hospital paid stipends. These then add to programs having to increase their size.
Programs may merge to provide clinical experiences which may not otherwise be When the academic year 1996-97 began in July 1996, the Wilford Hall residents, all funded by the Air Force, were assigned to approved rotations at Wilford Hall and UTHSCSA. Similarly, the UTHSSA residents, predominantly paid by the VA hospital and the county hospital, were assigned rotations at UTHSCSA and Wilford Hall. As the residents from each program adjusted to the schedule, going to previously unknown sites at Wilford Hall and UTHSCSA proved positive for the faculty at the sites and for the residents who made new friends as well as experienced new rotations.
The seminar schedule was similarly adjusted. The topics remained largely the same, but civilian and military faculty were scheduled as co-teachers whenever possible. This helped convey the idea that the programs and faculties were working together for the residents' clinical and seminar education. Over the first several months, the residents began mixing together rather than having the civilian residents on one side of the seminar room and the military residents on the other. This often leads to one large program that has the same problems that each had prior to the merger. Often times this will double the problems of the merged program, but not necessarily improve the merged program as a whole.
When UTHSCSA and WHMC merged, they were both very strong programs that were able to stand very well on their own. However, there were some prominent weaknesses that each had that limited their abilities to grow. Prior to the merger, UTHSCSA's weaknesses were having difficulty attracting some of the best residents, having difficulty finding staff to teach lectures, and having trouble finding enough residents to fill all the sites that were paying for residents' salaries. The UTHSCSA faculty were experienced and well seasoned, but there were not many young faculty. WHMC on the other hand, had young and energetic faculty who enjoyed teaching many of the basic psychiatry residency lectures. They attracted very competitive residents through the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program, and all the residents were fully salaried by the military. Some of the weaknesses of WHMC included that they had too few faculty to supervise all their residents and the residents needed more attending time. WHMC also lacked the breadth of experience, and residents needed to see sicker and indigent patients.
Combining the two programs enabled WHMC to give their enthusiastic and bright residents experience in civilian university sites with more senior faculty, brought more young and energetic attendings to the residency program, and improved the amount and quality of teachers available for the lecture series. The merger gave the Air Force the needed stability to survive faculty deployments without jeopardizing the residency program. For the University, the merger enabled it to give the civilian residents a broader patient experience with younger, insured and often higher functioning patients. It also expanded the clinical teaching and exposed them to new faculty and residents.
As can be seen, the merging of two stable programs to expand the educational and clinical experience was positive for both UTHSCSA and WHMC. Over ten years after the merger occurred, the combined program is significantly stronger than either program was individually. It would have been a much more daunting task if either of the programs had been struggling. Much of the success of the merger is also due to the people that instituted the merger and the reasons why it was done. The Residency Training Directors of the two programs created the merger to make a better overall residency program, not to save two programs that were doing poorly. The Training Directors decided that the programs were going to be merged; that trickled down to all the residents and staff-who also believed it. It has made the combined program a wonderful environment for residents, faculty, and staff. And as such education and patient care have been markedly improved.
